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‘You’, your joys and your sorrows, your memories 
and your ambitions, your sense of personal 
identity and free will, are in fact no more than 
the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells…” 
—Crick (1994, p. 3)
F
rancis Crick was an evangelical 
atheist. He believed that scientiﬁ  c 
understanding removed the need 
for religious explanations of natural 
phenomena. From James Watson’s 
and his early work, the structure of 
DNA explained the α, the origins of 
life. This was a starting point; from the 
elucidation of the structure of DNA, 
there was an explosion, a massive 
diversity of science that in part removed 
the need to postulate a creator or a 
creation myth. Francis still felt that life 
was no less astonishing just because it 
was biological and natural in origin. 
He had a consistent and completely 
rational world view without a need to 
invoke vitalism, or any non-material 
force (M. Crick 2004). And in the last 
decades of his life, he applied this 
philosophy to the Ω, consciousness.
Once the structure of DNA was 
known, the physicist George Gamow 
formed the RNA Tie Club, with Francis 
and eighteen others including his 
close friends Leslie Orgel and Sydney 
Brenner (2001); it was an ingathering 
that sowed seeds for future molecular 
biologists (Judson 1996). DNA had 
become the “α,” the beginning 
(Bronowski 1978), not just of Francis’s 
career, but of a whole new culture of 
scientiﬁ  c life and understanding (Crick 
1966). 
Ten years later, the secrets of 
DNA transcription and translation 
unmasked, Francis turned to 
consciousness. He admitted he knew 
little at ﬁ  rst, only that the structure of 
consciousness was as tough a problem 
as DNA’s structure. DNA was certainly 
not played out, but the Ferrier Lectures 
in the Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of London by David Hubel 
and Torsten Wiesel were just available, 
tempting Francis with an almost 
physicist’s view of neurons in action. 
Hubel and Wiesel wrote of functional 
architectures, embedded in beautiful, 
almost crystalline structure. The 
comprehension of mind invoked by a 
biological mechanism appeared ripe 
for the sort of thoughtful, theoretical 
science he had applied to DNA. Francis 
was now sixty years old and moved from 
Cambridge to the Salk Institute in La 
Jolla, California. Francis began with the 
brightest young minds he could ﬁ  nd.
David Marr was a young 
mathematician and physiologist 
whose doctoral thesis on a theory 
of mammalian brain function at 
Cambridge had brought him into some 
contact with Brenner and Francis. 
A professor at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, he began 
working with Tomasio Poggio of the 
Max Plank Institute in Tübingen on a 
computational theory of neuroscience. 
Following an invitation from Francis, 
Poggio and Marr spent the month of 
April, 1979 extending their intense 
examination of the core problems of 
visual perception. They spent hours 
sitting at the most western end of 
the Salk Institute, at the cafeteria or 
in Francis’s ofﬁ  ce, gazing into the 
Paciﬁ  c Ocean with all its daily changes, 
discussing not only architecture of 
visual cortex and visual perception, 
but the ramiﬁ  cations of a good theory 
of brain function. We know of these 
conversations, as the probing of Marr 
by Francis is captured in the ﬁ  nal 
chapter of Marr’s now classic book 
“Vision” (Marr 1982). (Although Marr 
speaks of a three-way conversation, 
judging from our own experiences 
as Francis’s younger colleagues, 
the interlocutor simply seems to be 
Francis.) 
Marr had been diagnosed with acute 
leukemia in the winter of 1978 (Marr 
and Vaina 1991). The one-month visit 
to the Salk Institute was an intellectual 
gift, for eighteen months later, Marr 
died. Francis had simultaneously lost 
a young friend and colleague who had 
brought an “incisive mind and creative 
energy” (Crick 1994, p. 77) and his best 
new ideas of a theoretical neurology 
to the brain (Marr 1969, 1970). And 
he saw the tragedy of Marr being cut 
off from solving the big problems for 
which he was so clearly destined. 
During those early years, Francis 
must have thought that consciousness 
was tractable—if only the right way of 
thinking was brought to bear on it. 
Francis’s brain was capable of collecting 
and ﬁ  ling away many disparate 
data, which he could then combine 
uniquely and imaginatively, leading 
to that “dramatic moment of sudden 
enlightenment that ﬂ  oods the minds 
when the right idea clicks into place” 
(Crick 1990, p. 141). Whatever his 
initial thoughts about the nature of the 
problem, Francis soon came to realize 
that the problem of consciousness was 
even tougher than he imagined, that 
the “click” was not happening with 
consciousness. In 1988, he wrote, “I 
have yet to produce any theory that 
is both novel and also explains many 
disconnected facts in a convincing way” 
(Crick 1990, p. 162).
Over the quarter century he was at 
the Salk Institute, Francis did propose 
solutions to some smaller problems 
in neuroscience (Sejnowski 2004) 
and brought consciousness into the 
scientiﬁ  c fold (Rich and Stevens 
2004). But something else was going 
on quietly and behind the scenes. 
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Francis was building an army to help 
him take on consciousness. This was 
not empire building with Francis as the 
head of a group of directed scientists 
in the Cambridge or German model. 
Francis continually encouraged and 
assisted young scientists to approach 
the hardest problems of the brain. 
Marr and Poggio were just the ﬁ  rst 
recruits he helped embolden. He 
started his long-time collaboration with 
Christof Koch, once a post-doctoral 
trainee with Poggio, on “The Problem 
of Consciousness” (Crick and Koch 
1990, 1992). His door was always open 
to graduate students, postdoctoral 
trainees, faculty who wanted to discuss 
those problems as many others and 
we can attest. Francis could be found 
daily at tea time, an ingathering of 
the Salk Institute computational and 
vision laboratories of Simon LeVay, 
Terry Sejnowski and Thomas Albright, 
surrounded by graduate students 
and post-doctoral trainees, with 
conversation ranging across science—
Francis listening to their stories of their 
explorations and encouraging them to 
reach beyond their horizons. Francis 
had a “love of the truth and helped 
others to move to the truth” (Watson 
2004).
When Francis worked on the 
structure of DNA, he had some simple 
facts, such as Chargaff’s Laws, and 
means to make point mutations from 
which it could be determined how 
function followed structure. But not a 
single neuroanatomist knew how many 
neurons actually converged in their 
input to a particular single cell. No one 
knew how to eliminate a speciﬁ  c cell 
type from a circuit— to make a point 
mutation, so to speak, in the structure 
of consciousness. His 1979 article in 
Scientiﬁ  c American, “Thinking about 
the Brain,” did not have much impact 
at the time, even when it explicitly 
described three needed methods: 
ﬁ  rst, a method by which all the 
connections to a single neuron could 
be stained; second, a method by which 
“all neurons of just one type could be 
inactivated, leaving the others more or 
less unaltered”; and third, a means to 
differentially stain each cortical area, 
“…so that we could see exactly how 
many there are, how big each one is 
and exactly how it is connected to other 
areas.” By the mid-1980s, Francis had 
realized that these massive holes in our 
understanding of the most simple brain 
facts were not being ﬁ  lled. Something 
needed to be done. 
Over the twenty years since the 
RNA Tie Club, molecular biology 
had matured. Francis actively began 
encouraging the inclusion of the 
critical tools of molecular biology in the 
study of neural circuits and perception; 
in his thinking, molecular biology was 
critical to understand how the brain 
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Francis Crick in his ofﬁ  ce. Behind him is a model of the human brain that he inherited from Jacob Bronowski. (Photo: Marc 
Lieberman)
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worked because it provided tools. He 
would encourage junior scientists, post-
doctoral trainees, and faculty—all those 
who had visited him over the years—to 
think about using these tools. He would 
give short homilies about the plethora 
of sub-types of neurons in the retina; 
would not the cortex be at least as rich 
in possibilities? Molecular tools could 
unravel this knot. 
As we reminisced after Francis’s 
death, we discovered that Francis 
had spoken with each of us on these 
molecular methods, across a twenty-
year interval. In the mid-1980s, Francis 
spoke with Ralph, pressing him to 
consider how he might do highly 
speciﬁ  c lesions of single neuron types 
in motion cortex using molecular 
identiﬁ  ers. At the time, the only tools 
imaginable were some sort of killer 
antibody approach. Twenty years 
later, Ed recalls Francis continuing 
to encourage this cross-disciplinary 
molecular and systems approach. It was 
absolutely imperative to Francis’s vision 
of the maturation of neuroscience 
that there would be a conjoining 
of molecular biology and systems 
neuroscience. We are sure we were not 
unique in hearing this call; with how 
many others had he shared his vision? 
The science of the mind is a 
thinker’s game. It is chess against the 
grandest masters, biological evolution 
and natural selection—and we are 
just learning to move the pieces. Our 
viewpoint is often myopic, with our 
noses pressed against the back row of 
the chessboard. It is hard to see the 
pieces, let alone their arrangement or 
the strategies they are forming. Francis 
may not have had the overview needed 
to reveal evolution’s gambit, but he 
knew the moves needed to clear the 
“tangle of difﬁ  culties” (Crick 1994, p. 
77) that prevented an unfogged view of 
his opponent’s pieces. 
Francis hoped for simplicity. He 
wrote, “Curiously enough, in biology 
it is sometimes those basic problems 
that look impossibly difﬁ  cult to 
solve which yield most easily….The 
biological problems that are really 
difﬁ  cult to unscramble are those where 
there is almost inﬁ  nity of plausible 
answers and one has to painstakingly 
attempt to distinguish between them.” 
(Crick 1990, p. 157–158). Watson 
and Crick had picked the right pieces 
of information to construct their 
model. Francis early on had had the 
same hopes to open the doors of 
consciousness (to paraphrase Huxley 
1963). Watson and Crick used their 
intuition to ﬁ  ll in the gaps. But Francis 
found that there were just too many 
possibilities, and the gaps in knowledge 
were still just too big for consciousness. 
In 1999, Francis felt that gentle 
and informal direction was not 
enough. Thus, he convened a 
meeting of molecular biologists and 
neuroscientists at the Salk Institute 
to encourage them to work together. 
He brought scientists including Tom 
Albright, Ursula Bellugi, Ed Callaway, 
Rusty Gage, Steve Heinemann, Terry 
Sejnowski, Chuck Stevens, and Inder 
Verma into one room and said it was 
time to get serious. He reminded them 
of the advantages of genetic methods 
for targeting speciﬁ  c cell types within 
complex neural circuits, and he 
reiterated the need for methods that 
could be used to identify, manipulate, 
and observe neural circuits in action. 
Not only were methods to be used 
in transgenic mice, but also methods 
based on viral vectors were needed to 
study the visual system of monkeys. 
From this, a number of initiatives 
moved forward, with studies ranging 
from the molecular biology of Williams 
syndrome to basic molecular tool 
building (Naldini et al. 1996; Blomer 
et al. 1997; Bellugi et al. 1999; Pfeifer 
et al. 2001; Zhao et al. 2001; Kaspar et 
al. 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Lechner et al. 
2002; Lein et al. 2004). 
Today the tools are emerging at an 
ever faster pace, at least in part due to 
Francis’s maneuvers behind the scenes 
and his encouragement of junior 
scientists. Time is curing Francis’s 
bout of scientiﬁ  c prematurity (Stent 
1972). Individual cell types will soon 
be reversibly inactivated (Johns et al. 
1999; Lechner et al. 2002; Slimko et 
al. 2002; Ibanez-Tallon et al. 2004); 
viral methods of tracing connections 
will start to ﬁ  ll in the gaps; new sensor 
methods for simultaneously recording 
from hundreds and thousands of 
identiﬁ  ed neurons are coming 
(Guerrero and Isacoff 2001; Zemelman 
and Miesenbock 2001; Tsien 2003). 
There is a new ﬁ  eld Francis termed 
“molecular psychology” or “molecular 
biology of systems neuroscience”; 
Albright simply calls it Neuroscience.
In 2001, Francis was diagnosed 
with colon cancer. He realized that 
the problem of the neural correlates 
of consciousness might outlast him. 
Francis was walking with a cane, 
still not waiting for anyone, nor 
allowing anyone to wait for him. He 
continued to ﬁ  nd time for new faces 
in the ﬁ  eld and continued to work on 
consciousness. While he had made 
many strides forward, he saw the race 
for him was winding down. He had 
had his hope for understanding the 
structure of consciousness. He had 
laid the groundwork. He decided to 
encapsulate his ideas in a “Framework” 
paper with Koch (Crick and Koch 
2003). For many of us it was clear that 
he was laying out where he would go, 
had he enough time. 
Each of the points of the Framework 
could form a major research initiative. 
Perhaps they should. But the central 
point is the approach to understanding 
consciousness; it is both structural 
and functional, peering forward into 
the future into what the shape might 
be. It was clear to his friends and 
colleagues that Francis was leaving a 
last testament. 
As the cancer ﬁ  nally caught up with 
Francis, he focused on the role of the 
rarely studied claustrum (Sherk 1986). 
He wrote internal memos, brought 
friends and colleagues to working 
lunches at home with Odile, his wife 
of ﬁ  fty-ﬁ  ve years. Why do this? Why all 
this focus on another part of the brain, 
when only months remained? (Indeed 
it turned out to be weeks.) Was it his 
way of saying goodbye, of bringing his 
extended family close again? We think 
not. Francis wanted to make sure his 
plan went forward. He stressed to his 
visitors queries about the origins of the 
claustrum, its molecular biology, its 
role in consciousness. He was using his 
framework, pointing out the route to 
understanding the Ω of his career. 
Francis was doing what he truly 
loved to his last moments. He needed 
to be doing science, perhaps more 
than ever, to take him away from the 
physical pain that he surely felt. He 
had built his army. Perhaps none of us 
even knew we had enlisted, but we had. 
And he was setting us off on the long 
march forward into a time that soon 
would not be for him. Francis died on 
the cusp of a new age of molecular 
systems neuroscience. Soon, we will 
have the tools and the data, but we will 
not have Francis. Francis had existed 
between the α of DNA and the Ω of 
consciousness. And for a man who 
December 2004  |  Volume 2  |  Issue 12  |  e419PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 2032
never believed in the afterlife, he had 
indeed achieved immortality.  
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